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PARTIES TO THIS APPEAL
The plaintiff and appellant is The Doctors Company ("TDC"), an insurance
company. There are two defendants and appellees: G. Gregory Drezga, MD, the named
insured on a TDC policy for medical malpractice; and Ms. Heidi Judd, personally and on
behalf of her son, Athan Montgomery.
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OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLEE DREZGA

JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court possesses jurisdiction, pursuant to Utah Code Section
78A-3-102(3)0) (2008), over this appeal of the orders and final judgment of the Third
Judicial District Court.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Summary judgment was properly entered by the district court in favor of
Appellees pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Among the statutory
provisions that may be relevant include Utah Code Sections 31A-21-105, 31A-21-106,
and31A-21-303.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The ultimate responsibility of this Court will be to assign loss arising from the tragic
circumstances of Athan Montgomery's birth. The parties to this case include The
Doctors Company ("TDC"), which seeks to invalidate a professional liability insurance
policy that it issued in 1996; Dr. G. Greggory Drezga ("Dr. Drezga" or "Drezga"), who
applied for and obtained the insurance policy to cover his medical practice; and Athan
Montgomery, who had the misfortunate to be born under tragic circumstances that led to
a malpractice action and judgment against Dr. Drezga.
This lawsuit, which began nearly a decade ago, represents an enduring campaign by
an insurer to avoid paying a valid and significant claim against the professional liability
policy that it issued to Dr. Drezga. TDC launched this declaratory action against the
empty chair of TDC's insured: owing to Dr. Drezga's unexplained absence, TDC sought
to be excused from maintaining its coverage of Dr. Drezga because of his alleged "noncooperation." Next, TDC cancelled the policy and sought to deny coverage based on
alleged misrepresentations that it discovered upon review of Dr. Drezga's application for
malpractice insurance. TDC subsequently sought and currently seeks to re-characterize
its termination of the policy as a rescission in order to deny coverage Finally, TDC
challenges the order entered by the district court that held it responsible for the legal fees
incurred by the court-appointed attorney for Dr. Drezga.
The district court entered summary judgment against TDC. On appeal, TDC asks this
Court to transfer TDC's financial loss to its absent insured, Dr. Drezga. Reversal would
likely leave Dr. Drezga without the means to satisfy the judgment against him.
2

FACTUAL RECORD
Twice before, this Court has grappled with issues arising from the tragic
circumstances of Athan Montgomery's delivery and birth. Given that the briefs of
Appellant TDC and Appellee Judd both retread this ground, and given the Court's
previous exposure to the general factual background, the utility of repeating this exercise
would likely be limited.
Instead, given the allegations made by TDC against Dr. Drezga, it is notable and
important to highlight the absence of certain facts from the record before this Court. For
example, consider the following:
•

There is no evidence in the record indicating that Dr. Drezga has ever been
aware of the malpractice suit that was brought against him.

•

There is no evidence in the record to suggest that Dr. Drezga disappeared in
a purposeful attempt to evade the malpractice action.

•

There is no evidence in the record to indicate that Dr. Drezga intentionally
failed to assist in the defense of the malpractice action.

•

There is no evidence in the record to demonstrate that Dr. Drezga declined
to appear at any proceeding during the malpractice action.

•

There is no evidence in the record indicating that Dr. Drezga has ever been
aware of the declaratory action brought against him by TDC.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In its appeal, TDC asks the Court to reverse the judgment of the district court and
retroactively rescind the medical malpractice insurance coverage TDC provided to Dr.
Drezga. However, public policy militates against this result, given that the purpose of
medical malpractice insurance is to fulfill the twin goals of protecting the insured from
the financial consequences of his or her clinical errors while simultaneously providing
financial compensation to those patients injured as a result of those errors. Here, the end
result of allowing TDC to retroactively rescind Dr. Drezga's coverage would be to punish
those parties that relied on such coverage, namely, Dr. Drezga himself Indeed, because
insurance companies are in the best position to evaluate whether an applicant qualifies for
coverage, public policy dictates that TDC's retroactive rescission argument be rejected.
Second, TDC's contention that Dr. Drezga violated his duty of cooperation is
unfounded, namely because there is no evidence to suggest that Dr. Drezga ever became
aware of (let alone failed to cooperate in the defense of) the medical malpractice claim
brought against him. Much like a deceased, disabled, or incapacitated person, Dr.
Drezga's absence does not equate to non-cooperation and TDC's argument to that effect
should be rejected.
Third, where, as here, the district court appointed counsel to represent Dr.
Drezga's interests, it is appropriate that the fees for such counsel be paid by TDC,
particularly given that TDC has failed to repay the premiums funded by Dr. Drezga and
arguably has used those premiums to fund the case against him. Thus, in this unique
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situation, this Court should affirm the district court's conclusion that TDC is responsible
for paying Dr. Drezga's defense costs.
ARGUMENT

I.

TDC SHOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO RETROACTIVELY AND
BELATEDLY RESCIND ITS INSURANCE COVER AGE OF
DR. DREZGA.

This Court should bring this longstanding case to a just conclusion by affirming
the district court's entry of summary judgment against TDC. The district court correctly
concluded that TDC may not retroactively rescind its coverage of Dr. Drezga for 1997
since TDC elected instead to cancel its policy with Dr. Drezga.1
Public policy supports this result. Rescission in this case would thwart the purpose of
insurance; namely, to protect the insured from the financial consequences of professional
errors while providing adequate compensation to innocent victims of medical
malpractice.
TDC justified its cancellation of Dr. Drezga's policy on the basis of alleged
misrepresentations made by Dr. Drezga in his application for insurance. What is not
known is whether these alleged errors resulted from innocent mistake, misunderstanding,
or confusion, or whether these misrepresentations were truly the product of malicious
intent. It is at least possible that the foreign-born Dr. Drezga misunderstood what
information was sought, given the legalistic language of the insurance application. For a
person without a native command of the English language, it is at least conceivable that
1

Rather than reiterate the applicable legal analysis, Dr. Drezga joins Section 1 of
Appellee Judd's brief.
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confusion over a verb tense—perhaps, say, misunderstanding whether the question
wanted to know whether he was presently involved in a malpractice case, as opposed to
whether he had previously been involved in such a case—could have led Dr. Drezga to
have inadvertently provided inaccurate information. Since TDC notes that Dr. Drezga
had prior malpractice claims that settled, it is possible that Dr. Drezga may not have
disclosed those incidents out of a belief that he had an obligation to maintain the
confidentiality of those settlements.
Thus, based on the posture of this case, this Court is left with a record where it
must be assumed, arguendo, that Dr. Drezga's application contained misrepresentations.
While TDC conveniently attests that it would not have extended a policy to Dr. Drezga
had it been aware of these misrepresentations (see R. 175-199), such testimony may be
nothing more than retroactive speculation. Perhaps Dr. Drezga could have provided an
adequate explanation for the apparent inaccuracies. Perhaps TDC would have
nevertheless been willing to issue a policy in exchange for a greater premium.
What is certain is that retroactive rescission in this case would punish the parties
that relied on TDC's issuance of insurance to Dr. Drezga. For starters, once armed with a
policy from TDC, Dr. Drezga had no reason to seek other insurance. Presumably he
engaged in his practice of medicine believing that TDC would both protect his interests
and provide for his patients in the event of tragedy. So, too, did Dr. Drezga's employer
rely on the fact that TDC had issued insurance to cover his medical practice. Most
tragically of all, Heidi Judd came to rely on the fact that her physician was covered by
malpractice insurance.
6

This Court should not permit TDC to retroactively rescind Dr. Drezga's insurance
policy, lest the insurance industry view such an outcome as an invitation to skimp on the
applicant screening process. After all, if insurers believed that they could retroactively
rescind their policies by discovering misrepresentations after the inception of a
malpractice case, insurers would have less incentive to commit precious resources to the
initial screening process. Indeed, a potential insurer, at the time it receives an application
for insurance, is in the best position to investigate the applicant and potentially prevent a
chain of tragic reliance. For this reason, it is vital that Utah law provide incentive for
insurers to invest the time and resources necessary to screen applicants before issuing
professional liability insurance.
II.

THE DISAPPEARANCE OF DR. DREZGA DOES NOT CONSTITUTE
NON-COOPERATION.

This Court should reject TDC's contention that, by sole virtue of his
disappearance, Dr. Drezga violated his contractual obligation under the policy to
cooperate in the defense of the malpractice claim against him. There is absolutely no
evidence in the record to suggest that Dr. Drezga ever became aware of the malpractice
action. Nor is there any evidence that might suggest that Dr. Drezga disappeared in order
to avoid a lawsuit against him. The singular fact in the record is this: Dr. Drezga has
simply vanished.
The unexplained disappearance of Dr. Drezga should not provide TDC with an
excuse to terminate his insurance policy. An insurer's duty to defend its insured survives
the death of its insured; it endures during any period of an insured's disability; and it
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continues notwithstanding the incapacity of its insured. TDC has not been so bold as to
suggest that an insurer could escape its contractual responsibilities in these circumstances
based on the non-cooperation of the dead, disabled, or incapacitated. After all, one of the
very purposes of insurance is to safeguard individuals, their estates, injured third parties,
and society from the consequences of these calamities. By the same reasoning, the
unavailability of Dr. Drezga should not permit his insurer to disclaim valid claims against
Dr. Drezga's insurance policy.
III.

TDC SHOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE LEGAL FEES
INCURRED TO SUCCESSFULLY DEFEND ITS INSURED FROM
TDC'S DECLARATORY ACTION.

This Court should affirm the district court's order to ensure that Dr. Drezga's
court-appointed counsel may be fairly compensated for defending Dr. Drezga from this
declaratory action filed by TDC. The singular distinguishing factor of this case is the
absence of Dr. Drezga and TDC's decision to pursue litigation against the empty chair of
its insured.
This Court should reject TDC's suggestion that an impermissible conflict would
result from its payment to the attorney appointed by the district court to represent its
absent insured. TDC contends that:
were he present, it is hard to believe that [Dr.] Drezga would accept the
services of counsel paid by his adversary. Such counsel would have an
immediately apparent conflict of interest in serving two diametricallyopposed masters.
See Aplt. Br. at 62.
8

This contention betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of Utah's Rules of
Professional Conduct. Dr. Drezga's counsel owes his duty of loyalty to Dr. Drezga.
Assuming that Dr.Drezga—or an appropriate court—consented to allow his counsel to be
paid by a third-party, as is permissible under the governing ethical rules, Dr. Drezga's
counsel's duties are owed solely to Dr. Drezga. The payment of fees does not transform
a third-party payer into a client. Dr. Drezga's counsel would not have two masters.
TDC also relies on Travelers Indemnity Company of Connecticut v. Mayfield, 923
S.W.2d 590 (Texas 1996). In Mayfield, the Texas Supreme Court reversed a district
court order that had compelled an insurance carrier to pay the litigation costs for counsel
for a workers' compensation plaintiff in a dispute between the parties. The Mayfield
court held that the district court had abused its discretion and exceeded its inherent
authority when it ordered the payment of attorneys' fees in the absence of an authorizing
statute or contract.
It is not surprising that TDC touts Mayfield as persuasive authority. But the
present circumstances are both extraordinary and clearly distinguishable from Mayfield.
First, the insurer in Mayfield was not pursuing action against a missing party. Second,
unlike here, the adjudication of the parties' rights in Mayfield would have little effect on
third parties. Third, the insurer in Mayfield did not first cancel its insured's coverage
before seeking to rescind it. Fourth, the Mayfield court refused to pay up-front costs of
litigation, whereas affirmance of the district court's order here would result in payments
to Dr. Drezga's counsel only after the successful defense of Dr. Drezga's interests.
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Additionally, though the insurer in May field objected to an order compelling it to
fund its adversary, the insurer had not retained funds belonging to its insured. In this
case, TDC argues that "Funding for Drezga's defense in this lawsuit, if it is to be
obtained at all, should come from a source other than TDC." Aplt. Br. at 63. This
position is somewhat ironic because, due to TDC's original retention of Dr. Drezga's
premiums, the funding for TDC's attack on Dr. Drezga's contractual rights could be said
to have begun with funding from Dr. Drezga. To be sure, TDC also argues that "[a]
refond of policy premiums was not feasible due to Drezga's disappearance." Aplt. Br. at
17. Yet TDC did not pay the premiums into the court. Nor did TDC convey these funds
to the State of Utah as lost or unclaimed property. Instead, TDC retained these funds
and initiated legal action against its missing insured. Thus it could fairly be said that
TDC kept Dr. Drezga's money and used it to fund litigation against him in absentia.
Finally, given that the district court agreed that TDC's attack on Dr. Drezga's
contractual rights was without merit, fundamental fairness and equity suggest that TDC
should bear the costs of the defense rather than the prevailing party. This Court should
affirm that TDC is responsible for paying the costs of defense incurred by Dr. Drezga's
court-appointed counsel.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above and in the brief of Appellee Judd, the orders and
judgment of the district court should be affirmed.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 12th day of March, 2009.
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C.
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Appointed Attorney for Defendant-Appellee
G. Gregory Drezga
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